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Notes 
The Waiting Is the Hardest Part: DOES LONGER 
PATENT PENDENCY MEAN MORE VALUABLE 
PATENTS? 
Michael P. Ellenberger 
 
ABSTRACT—The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
is one of the busiest—and slowest—patent offices in the world. The 
average utility patent is pending for 25.3 months before issuance. For parties 
that require legal protections in fast-moving technological fields, such as 
mobile technology startup, the waiting could be detrimental. Moreover, the 
patent backlog problems worldwide cost the global economy over $10 
billion per year. Even under such a delay, an increasing number of issued 
patents are threatened or invalidated in the U.S. court system. 
Undoubtedly, then, if patents are considered to have “quality” only if 
they are both (a) valid and (b) litigation-proof, the USPTO is failing. If, 
however, instead the consideration is broadened as to what it means for a 
patent to be “high quality”— using the four “patent worth considerations” of 
market, signal, impact, and reputational value—then the situation looks far 
from disastrous. This note proposes to examine the time-value dynamic of a 
patent and evaluate whether, in consideration of a variety of metrics, long-
pending patents are more valuable. In short, are patents worth the wait? 
This note concludes with proposals for a more efficient Patent Office 
through examination of existing functional policies both internal to the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is one of the 
busiest patent offices in the world, fielding approximately 500,000 newly-
filed utility applications annually, and receiving more certified mail per day 
than any other single entity.1 At such a volume, the time from application 
filing to issuance is long. Owing to a myriad of factors, the average pendency 
period in the United States is 25.3 months and can be as long as twenty-eight 
months for “Networks, Multiplexing, Cable, and Security,” a burgeoning and 
crowded art space.2 
Patent pendency is frustrating for the impatient but potentially lethal for 
the startup.3 A recent report from the UK Intellectual Property Office 
estimated that the “combined losses from each year of backlog in the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, Japan Patent Office, and the European Patent 
 
 1 Iain M. Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and 
Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 19, 23 (Wesley M. Cohen and 
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (“The USPTO is one of the earliest and among the most visible agencies 
of the federal government, receiving more certified mail per day than any other single organization in the 
world.”); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application 
Data, 99 REV. ECON. STAT. 550, 552 (2016) (“Each year between 300,000 and 500,000 patent 
applications are filed at the Patent Office.”). 
 2 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2016, at 180 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY16PAR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M6RA-3HA2] [hereinafter PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT]. 
 3 MARK SCHULTZ & KEVIN MADIGAN, THE LONG WAIT FOR INNOVATION: THE GLOBAL PATENT 
PENDENCY PROBLEM 3 (2016). 
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Office [combined] costs the global economy over $10 billion a year.”4 While 
the pendency brings the costs of lost revenue, it does not necessarily impact 
the quality of the applications across four classifications: market value, 
signal, impact, and reputational considerations. 
Compared with the bifurcated search and examination stages before the 
European Patent Office (EPO), the USPTO consolidates the two steps into 
one, increasing complexity and stress on examiners in their limited allotted 
time and incorporating additional sources of error.5 Research suggests that 
the time allotted to each examiner per patent, absent the already inherent 
intellectual rigor of the position, induces examiners to grant invalid patents 
already “on the margin.”6 Coupled with a backlog of a half million patents 
still awaiting examination, the incentives for an examiner to rush through an 
application and render a quick, rather than quality, decision is all too high.7 
Moreover, the view that disclosure-for-monopoly rights is the driving 
force for patent law in the United States is a faulty “simple view” of 
intellectual property rights, and one wherein “inventors should be loath to 
disclose any more information than necessary to obtain patent protection.”8 
Mere patent protection provides insufficient incentive for a complete 
disclosure: such an arrangement is too weak to drive the engine of patent 
law. There must be more. 
Undoubtedly, if patents are considered to have “quality” only if they 
are both (a) valid and (b) litigation-proof, then the USPTO is failing. Patents 
are continually challenged, overruled, or invalidated before district courts, 
the Patent Trials and Appeal Board (PTAB), the Federal Circuit, and the 
Supreme Court. If instead the consideration is broadened as to what it means 
for a patent to be “high quality”—if the introduction of patent signaling, 
reputation, or minor, readily implementable tweaks to the Patent Office are 
allowed to hold worth—then the situation looks far from disastrous. 
Part I of this note will look at the Patent Office’s function and the factors 
that feed into pendency: application backlog, examiner incentives, and rate 
of application. Part II will investigate the value-quality-worth dynamics of 
patents, and how pendency, while depriving applicants of raw financial gain, 
may not inhibit a patent’s value. In doing so, Part II will further develop a 
new multifaceted model for patent value. Finally, Part III will consider 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Colleen V. Chien & Jay P. Kesan, Comparing Patent Quality at the USPTO and EPO, LAW360 
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/863111/comparing-patent-quality-at-the-uspto-and-
epo [https://perma.cc/5BGL-YL55] (reflecting a joint presentation on the subject available within the 
article). 
 6 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 552. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626 (2002). 
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potential improvements to the patent system in the United States, 
improvements that will decrease patent pendency without harming patent 
value when considering the new paradigm proposed in Part II. 
I. PATENT OFFICE FUNCTION 
A. Pendency 
The lack of expedited service at the USPTO is largely due to the 
substantial number of patents previously filed but not yet examined, a 
backlog further exacerbated by the uptick in filings in the 21st century.9 The 
USPTO handled 629,647 applications in 2015—including utility (589,410), 
design (39,097), and plant (1,140) patent applications.10 325,979 patents 
were granted.11 According to the Patent Office’s 2016 Performance and 
Accountability Report (PAR), patent applications on average received a first 
action within 16.2 months of filing and remained in the Patent Office 25.3 
months.12 While the total pendency measure is within the USPTO fiscal year 
2016 target, the time to first action—the period it takes an examiner to 
determine faults or deficiencies in the filed application—is slower than the 
USPTO’s published target of 14.8 months.13 
That’s not to say change hasn’t come. At the start of the Obama 
Administration in 2009, the USPTO backlog of unexamined patent 
applications was about 750,000.14 Driven by USPTO protocol and an 
increased awareness of such slog, backlog was cut by over 200,000 in the 
2016 fiscal year, a 28% decrease in spite of an annual increase in filings of 
almost 4%.15 Along with shortening the backlog, the USPTO has continually 
chipped away at pendency, cutting the figure from 25.9 months in January 
2009 to 16.2 months in September 2016.16 All of this, says the USPTO, 
“means that deserving patented technology can reach consumers at home and 
around the world sooner than they would have in the past, further driving 
innovation and economic growth.”17 
 
 9 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963 - 2015, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
(June 15, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://perma.cc/B38E-
R367] [hereinafter U.S. Patent Statistics Chart]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. 
 13 Id. at 23–24. 
 14 Id. at 3. 
 15 Id.; U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, supra note 9. 
 16 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 17 Id. 
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B. International Patent Office Comparisons 
The pendency period before the USPTO is on par with its four peer 
offices in other countries, collectively comprising the five largest patent 
offices (IP5): USPTO, Japanese Patent Office, Korea Patent Office, Chinese 
Patent Office, and European Patent Office (EPO).18 In its 2016 Annual 
Report, the EPO disclosed that: 
For examination, the objective is to progressively reduce the total time for an 
examination procedure, from receipt of a request for examination to the 
announcement of the intention to grant a patent under Rule 71(3) EPC, to 12 
months on average by 2020. As a first step, median examination pendency has 
been reduced to 23.3 months.19 
Pendency is coming down across the globe. The other countries in the 
IP5 have similar or longer waits (2.8 years in Korea, 2.9 in China, 5.3 in 
Japan), but none of the IP5 countries are within striking distance of the one 
year goal of the EPO.20 By global standards, however, the offices of the IP5 
comprise five of the seven fastest global offices to decision—a far cry from 
the ten and 10.1 years of pendency in Thailand and Brazil, respectively.21 
And, while the EPO is quicker to issuance than the USPTO, much of 
the disparity is covered in the EPO’s production of a search report, which 
advises potential applicants on the patentability and the technological 
landscape of their application. The search report takes time to produce, 
certainly, but heads off many potential fruitless prosecutions.22 Thus, when 
the EPO patent prosecution timeline is adjusted to account for the lapse 
between publication of the search report and subsequent examination, “EPO 
pendency is actually very similar, at least with respect to recent patents, to 
the USPTO pendency.”23 
The published search report may be an effective tool for the United 
States to counter long pendency. Before the EPO, the publication 
discourages investors who have potentially invalid or insignificant 
inventions from filing applications frivolously and demanding an examiner’s 
 
 18 IP5, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/international-protection/office-policy-and-international-affairs-ip5 [https://perma.cc/SDF6-
HJ6A]. 
 19 EUR. PATENT OFFICE, EPO QUALITY REPORT 2016, at 24 (2016), available at 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/D4D30CF45FD00F51C125814C003C4B0D/$F
ile/epo_quality_report_2016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6BX-CTSD]. 
 20 SCHULTZ & MADIGAN, supra note 3, at 1. 
 21 Id. 
 22 L. Petrucci & J. Beatty, Fast and Sure: Options to Quicker Processing Before the EPO, EPI 
INFORMATION, http://information.patentepi.com/4-16/fast-and-sure-options-to-quicker-processing-
before-the-epo/ [https://perma.cc/XDR5-S7FE]; see infra Part III.C. 
 23 Chien & Kesan, supra note 5. 
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time that could go towards examining a more valid patent.24 And despite the 
pendency time coming down compared to a decade ago, studies by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research found that “the pressure to make 
decisions too quickly may be one reason the patent office grants ‘bad’ 
patents—approving weak applications that never should’ve been granted in 
the first place—that allow patent trolls to thrive.”25 
The differences don’t end there. Indeed, the rate of opposition at the 
EPO is “more than thirty times higher” than the rate of reexamination 
domestically.26 Before the EPO, judicial challenges lead to revocations of the 
patent or restriction of the patent right in roughly 35% and 33% of the cases, 
respectively.27 In the U.S., “re-examination results in a cancellation of the 
patent right in only 10 percent of all cases.”28 Since the passage of the 
America Invents Act, patent pendency and patent rules have changed 
considerably in both jurisdictions, and the U.S. reexamination procedure has 
been significantly amended. Still, the idea that stronger patents result from 
more rigorous (and lengthier) prosecution assignments is still not well-
defined. 
C. The Cost of Delay 
Patents are hardly the only way innovators can protect their 
investments, but they are one of the most prevalent. As will be explored, 
patent pendency hurts innovators but may have further ramifications to non-
inventive society. As patent backlogs continue to linger at major worldwide 
patent offices, the stress of pending applications may force an examiner’s 
hand into issuing suboptimal patents, which further reverberates throughout 
the patent world. As such, pendency can reciprocally harm patent offices in 
reputation and revenue. 
The USPTO is aware that delays create significant costs to innovators 
seeking protection. The result? A limiting of the number of hours an 
examiner spends per patent in order to expedite the process.29 As such, the 
average patent gets about nineteen hours before an examiner in total, 
between researching prior art, drafting rejections and responses, and 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 Brian Fung, Inside the Stressed-Out, Time-Crunched Patent Examiner Workforce, WASH. POST 
(July 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/31/inside-the-stressed-
out-time-crunched-patent-examiner-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/Z5SH-7N45]. 
 26 Stuart J. H. Graham et al., Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of U.S. Patent Re-examinations 
and European Patent Oppositions, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 74, 75 (Wesley 
M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 75-76. 
 29 Fung, supra note 25. 
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interfacing with prosecuting attorneys.30 Plainly, this allotment is 
insufficient. Frakes and Wasserman, in their investigation into whether time 
pressures placed on examiners force the issuance of bad patents, determined 
that “as an examiner is given less time to review an application, the less 
active she becomes in searching for prior art, the less likely she becomes to 
make obviousness rejections (which are especially time-intensive exercises), 
and the more likely she becomes to grant the patent.”31 Regardless of the 
quality of the material before them, examiners under time crunches will both 
increase obviousness rejections for the sake of time, or simply move for 
issuance, even if there are claimed elements that may not fit validity 
requirements. 
Delays hurt innovators in a number of ways. A study by Joan Farre-
Mensa et al. found that for each year a startup’s application is delayed before 
the patent body, the startup’s employment and sales growth are reduced by 
21% and 28% respectively over the five years following the eventual 
approval.32 Resultantly, long delays at the patent office can disincentivize a 
company from innovating or patenting its technologies, stunting not only its 
individual progress but also the nation’s technological progress. As Mark 
Schultz and Kevin Madigan postulate, the patent office functions somewhat 
as a promise to the inventors it serves, a signpost by which a prospective 
inventor can buoy itself.33 But “if the patent system is to support local 
innovation, then the patent system needs to serve entrepreneurs with speed 
and efficiency.”34 
Substantial academic effort has been put into understanding the 
examiner-patent relationship and the timescale-based promotion mechanism 
that plagues examiners. For example, examiners with a certain level of 
experience necessarily move to higher General Schedule (GS) pay scales.35 
This promotion allows fewer hours per patent, which in turn increases the 
likelihood of patent granting.36 More provocatively, if all examiners were 
allowed as many hours per patent as an entry level (GS-7) examiner, the 
 
 30 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 553. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Joan Farre-Mensa et al., The Bright Side of Patents 3 (USPTO Econ. Working Paper No. 2015-5 
Dec. 15, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2729060 [https://perma.cc/CV3A-RJ8N]. 
 33 SCHULTZ & MADIGAN, supra note 3, at 19 (“Patent pendency statistics are a strong indicator of 
how serious a country is about supporting its own entrepreneurs.”). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Gene Quinn, Perspective of an Anonymous Patent Examiner, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/03/16/prespective-of-an-anonymous-patent-examiner/id=2190/ 
[https://perma.cc/43BS-HJ58]. 
 36 Id.; Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 555. 
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USPTO’s overall grant rate would fall 20%.37 Examiner tenure at the Patent 
Office and examiner grant rates are directly related, despite more 
experienced examiners receiving the same or more technically proficient 
applications, suggesting an independent variable unrelated to application 
quality may have staggering effects on patentability.38 
Financially, however, the backlog has far greater impact on the 
financial viability of the patent-seeking entity. In avoidance of entities losing 
significant portions of their terms to prosecution pendency, the Patent Term 
Adjustment (PTA) statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(C), allows for Type A and 
Type B delay awards when, for example, the USPTO takes more than four 
months after the Request for Continued Examination (RCE) is filed to act on 
the application.39 However, § 154(b)(2)(C) further provides for a deduction 
from any PTA award “equal to the period of time during which the applicant 
failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution of the 
application.”40 Thus, the tension between applicant failure and USPTO delay 
must be weighed such that applicants are not disgorged of patent exclusivity 
due to backlog. 
The costs of patents are substantial. Inventors pay for filing, cede their 
disclosure to the public, and wait years for issuance. What, exactly, do they 
get in return? 
II. MEASURING PATENT QUALITY 
The USPTO invests significant resources (nearly $2.8 billion in 2016) 
to further its published “Goal I” of “optimizing patent quality and 
timeliness.”41 While the constitutionally codified goal of the patent system is 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”42 the USPTO has 
distilled that broad heading into three aspects to further that objective: “(1) 
examining all of the patent applications prior to issuing patents, (2) issuing 
only high quality, valid patents, and (3) treating all inventors and 
technologies equally.”43 Specifically, the USPTO instituted the Patent 
Examiner Technical Training Program “aimed at encouraging innovation 
and strengthening the quality and accessibility of the patent system.”44 Patent 
 
 37 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 560. 
 38 Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 
REV. ECON. STAT. 817, 826 (2012). 
 39 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A) (2015). 
 40 See id. § 154(b)(2)(C); Reduction of Period of Adjustment of Patent Term, 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c). 
 41 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 121. 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 43 Lily J. Ackerman, Prioritization: Addressing the Patent Application Backlog at the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 68 (2011). 
 44 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 174.  
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quality indisputably means something different to the agency than to an 
applicant, and perhaps to an individual inventor than to a larger entity. 
The valuation of a patent is necessarily multifaceted, such that if the 
private value of a patent allows incorporation of variables beyond those 
considered in the simple view of disclosure and exclusivity, “then we need 
to reconsider the simple view’s implication that legal rules tend to under-
reward invention because appropriability is imperfect.”45 The enumeration 
of patent quality must necessarily be considered through the market value, 
signal, reputational, and impact considerations to be complete. 
A. The Market Value Consideration 
Patent worth may well be modeled by the economic value connoted by 
those patent-sanctioned exclusivities. In considering the landscape of 
patented products, economists consider the raw worth of patented products 
comprising the “brokered patent market” to be a fluctuating landscape in 
which “the only constant appears to be change.”46 In 2016, the value of the 
brokered patent market was $165 million and the entire market $11 billion, 
both of which change considerably year-over-year.47 That $11 billion of 
intellectual property is spread across more than 3,500 packages, comprising 
over 86,000 assets.48 Through assignment data, experts estimate that $2.3 
billion of that market has sold, a number that likely underestimates the total 
sales as not all assignments are recorded.49 Intellectual property, brokered or 
otherwise, changes hands constantly in the United States and to significant 
financial effect. 
More specifically, the average asking price per asset by technology 
group includes $235,000 for software and $193,000 for communications, 
with a market average of $197,320 per asset.50 For U.S.-issued assets, that 
market average was $271,440.51 These sales figures also lend some validity, 
outside market value, to protecting patents through litigation. Of the 
collections of IP assets sold on the market (comprising a package), 10.2% 
have at least one U.S. patent litigated after the listing date.52 “[O]n a per-U.S. 
patent basis, about 1.2% of U.S. patents presented are litigated.”53 Thus, 
 
 45 Long, supra note 8, at 635. 
 46 Kent Richardson et. al., Inside the 2016 Brokered Patent Market, IAM, Jan./Feb. 2017, at 34. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 34–35. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 36. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 44. 
 53 Id. 
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patents have considerable monetary worth, here termed the “value 
consideration,” which can be degraded by insufficient examination and by 
pendency at the examining office. 
Implicit are two points: the quality of patents issued by the USPTO 
necessarily is imperfect (that is, the fact that claims are litigated, even if 
many are found to be valid, means the USPTO is frequently issuing invalid 
patents), and the cost of those litigations must be considered in the value, and 
thus quality, of the patent grant. 
To the first point, litigation before the PTAB suggests that patents 
issued are far from perfect, with some patentability challenges showing 
greater than 50% reversal rates, including Section 102 and 112 rejections.54 
If there exists a certain amount of necessary time for prosecuting a patent 
and any means undercuting that time will compromise patent quality 
regarding its judicial validity, then judicial workload will necessarily 
increase with any decrease in pendency below the quality-pendency 
threshold marker.  
Specifically, challenges for § 112(a) issues (deficient written 
description, enablement) have an overall 52% chance of reversal considering 
both PTAB and appellate decisions; § 112(b) (indefiniteness) has a 48% 
chance; § 102 (novelty), 57% for at least one claim and 49% across all 
claims; and § 103 (obviousness), 43% on one claim and 34% across all 
claims.55 PTAB and Federal Circuit reversals are, in theory, direct notations 
of USPTO quality failures—decisions in which a judicial entity overrules the 
Patent Office in determining the validity of a previously issued patent.56 
Here the patent-value-matrix widens as additional considerations exist 
in litigation-validity outcomes: while pharmaceutical and medical patents 
are more likely than not to be upheld, the majority of computer and 
communication-based technology patents are overturned.57 Additionally, 
“the age of a patent seems to be an important predictor of validity—pre-1990 
approvals are much more likely to be upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (‘CAFC’) than post-1990 approvals.”58 Patents are 
frequently and expensively litigated; improper examination and issuance of 
invalid claims can significantly diminish their value consideration. 
 
 54 Update on ex parte PTAB Appeals Reversal Rates: High Reversal Rates Maintained Except for 
101 – Nonstatutory Rejections, ANTICIPAT BLOG (Aug. 23, 2017), https://blog.anticipat.com/2017/08/23/
update-on-ex-parte-ptab-appeals-reversal-rates-high-reversal-rates-maintained-except-for-101-
nonstatutory-rejections/ [https://perma.cc/3S8L-ZNTW]. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of 
Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1042–43 (1998). 
 57 Cockburn et al., supra note 1, at 45–46. 
 58 Id. at 46. 
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B. The Signal Consideration 
To more fully understand the worth of patents in the United States, the 
scope must be further broadened. Scholars argue that patents retain value 
from their ability to act as signals: Clarisa Long of Columbia Law School 
rejects the “simple view” of intellectual property rights, and instead looks at 
patents as signals.59 Specifically, she writes: 
[Patent portfolios] can indicate what lines of research the firm is undertaking 
and what the firm does and doesn’t consider valuable, outline a research 
trajectory that adumbrates fields the firm may be branching into next, disclose 
how fast the firm is proceeding within a particular area of research, and reveal 
other valuable dynamic information.60  
This view incorporates a bird’s-eye view of the patentscape, wherein 
the value of intellectual property is determined not only by what it can fetch 
on the open market but by what the IP means for the process of innovation 
and creation in the same space. 
Signals further serve to supplement the value lost from any financial 
delays. Because patents are published at eighteen months from filing, 
regardless of validity, an entire facet of the patent’s worth is necessarily 
staged such that the Patent Office delay is irrelevant: the signal will occur at 
publication, regardless of when the patent issues. Thus, if patents are valued 
not only for their economic worth but also for their signaling ability, the two-
year slog to issuance is, at least partially, mitigated. 
Beyond the signaling value of the application itself, patents can act as 
signals for the firm at large. To that end, “[if] patents are correlated with less 
readily observable firm characteristics,” they can serve as a signal of firm 
quality.61 Put alternately, the quality of the patent is independent of the 
pendency before the USPTO when taken broadly to incorporate the patent’s 
function as an indicium of what the firm is doing and where its research and 
development processes lie. Specifically, a patent may “reduce the cost of 
communicating private information to the market regarding the financial 
prospects of the firm,” potentially increasing the patent’s signatory value.62 
Under signal theory, then, the USPTO may increase patent worth simply by 
decreasing the requisite time to publication or allowing further signal 
capacities outside of the examination. 
To only value a patent’s disclosure is to fail to see the entire picture. 
That is, if the “value of a patent is composed of additional variables that the 
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simple view does not consider, then it may be rational to seek patent rights 
even when the expected cost of the rights is greater than the expected but-for 
rents.”63 It is thus likely that there exists a variable that is unaffected by the 
pendency before the PTO, and dictated solely by the patent’s ability to signal 
the publication requirement. For some applications, this signaling value to 
the patentee may manifest as “extra capital [the applicant] is able to raise in 
capital markets because of the information conveyed by the patent.”64 
Still, additional patent-economic theories support the approach that 
disclosure, and not the issued patent grant, is the marker of quality—and 
thus, the time lag before the Patent Office hardly detracts from value.65 Under 
disclosure theory, patents are not presumed necessary to spur innovation.66 
Rather, inventors will solve the problems that arise from the non-rivalrous, 
non-excludable nature of ideas by maintaining secrecy over their 
inventions.67 That is, applicants are not incentivized by patents to invest their 
resources into new innovations, but once these innovations occur they are 
incentivized to disclose. 
If signal theory is allowed to stand beside the monetary value of a 
patent, the quality and worth of the application becomes far more complex 
and inclusive. In some ways, the pendency before the Patent Office is 
negated by the mandatory publication date at eighteen months.68 That is, “[i]f 
inventors might gain from publicizing information in a patent, then they may 
choose to seek patent protection, even if the anticipated value of the 
exclusive rights received in return were zero.”69 Undoubtedly, if pendency 
dissuades inventors from filing patent applications, then the value and 
quality decreases.70 But the Patent Office has a long history of accepting 
more filings than the year before.71 While the backlog remains, and time to 
issuance stays over the two-year hurdle, the mandatory publication date may 
salvage significant worth from the application. 
C. The Impact Value 
Beyond the monetary and signaling values of a patent, there are inherent 
qualities in an application that factor into the patent’s overall worth. An 
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Intellectual Asset Management and Santa Clara study led by Chien and 
Kesan investigated the differences in perceived quality metrics between the 
USPTO and the EPO.72 The EPO ranked above its U.S. counterpart in 
consistency, predictability, search, evaluation of obviousness, consideration 
of Non-Patent Literature, evaluation of specification, and adequate time.73 
Meanwhile, the USPTO ranked ahead of the EPO in customer service, cost, 
and timeliness.74 
A major outcome of this—and a detriment to the quality of patents—is 
the variability in the scope of claims allowed. A common metric in patent 
quality—and one most readily quantifiable—is the number of citations it 
receives in other patent applications.75 Here too, human error resides. 
Functionally, “examiners who tend to allow broader claims will impinge on 
a greater number of follow-on inventions and therefore receive more 
citations over time.”76 Thus frequent markers of quality are dependent on the 
skill and prosecution style of the particular examiner (that is, “prior research 
has emphasized the degree to which the number of citations received by a 
patent is an indicator of its underlying inventive significance”).77 Inventions 
bringing paradigm shifts and often those with scarce prior art are most 
heavily cited. But, as Iain Cockburn admits, “[c]itations may also reflect the 
quality or scope of the disclosure accompanying the claims.”78 
Like the reputational value, the impact value of a patent is directly 
related to the pendency period and thus hampered by an inefficient Patent 
Office. Most notably, patents are driven by citation metrics, such that a well-
cited patent is considered to be a stronger (and more valuable) one. Such 
strength is reduced proportionally when a patent has less time to garner 
citations. The effects are undoubtedly alleviated by the publication at 
eighteen months (as with signaling), but in the absence of an issued patent, 
the impact value is tempered by pendency. 
D. The Reputational Value 
Of course, any patent office has a vested interest in insuring issuance of 
high-quality patents; both its reputation, and the stability of the patent market 
 
 72 Chien & Kesan, supra note 5. 
 73 Joff Wild, New Survey Explores Perceived Quality Gaps Between the USPTO and EPO, and 
Identifies User Priorities, IAM (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.iam-media.com/patents/new-survey-
explores-perceived-quality-gaps-between-uspto-and-epo-and-identifies-user [https://perma.cc/5LVW-
BEPK]. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See, e.g., Cockburn et al., supra note 1, at 22. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 45. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
202 
are theoretically at stake.79 Specifically, when firms file and receive patent 
rights there exists some expectation that the grant confers exclusivity to the 
patentee. As described by Long, “issuance of a patent stands for the 
proposition that the PTO has reviewed the information contained in a patent 
and declared that it describes something new, useful, and nonobvious.”80 The 
USPTO has strong reputational pressure to continue to issue sound, valid, 
and reasonably litigation-proof patents to propagate the patent system in the 
United States. 
Reputational value is outfitted in the interplay between USPTO 
examiners and the patents they issue. The possibility exists that “USPTO 
patent examination procedures do allow for significant differences across 
examiners in the nature and scope of patent rights that are granted,” a finding 
that “points to an important role for litigation and judicial review in checking 
the impact of discretion and specialization in the patent examination 
process.”81 Given the variability of issuance before the USPTO, there are “as 
many patent offices as there are patent examiners,” further prompting the 
question of whether the significant pendency period is due to more thorough 
investigation or simply slow examiner action.82 Thus, a significant 
determinant of issuance—and thus a determinant of the quality of patents 
outputted by the USPTO—is dependent on the individual examiner. If patent 
worth is significantly variable depending on the examiner in the current state, 
the USPTO must move for conformity to ease judicial burden, but also to 
preserve their reputation as distributers of constitutionally-protected 
material. 
Finally, reputational value comes to investors simply in the form of a 
“patent pending” moniker applicable to their invention. Functioning as 
something separate from the patent as a signal, the patent pending 
denomination is cosmetic and may serve notice to competitors that the 
investor’s product is, at least potentially, novel and patentable.83 
The reputational considerations—the most relevant metrics for the 
Patent Office considered in this study, and the most directly tied to USPTO 
performance—are directly tied to pendency. That is, the reputational value 
of a patent is stronger when the Patent Office is more efficient and more 
correct—inclusive of both pendency and validity (i.e. strength) of patents 
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issued. That said, reputational values are the least substantial in the overall 
worth of a patent. The monetary, signaling, and impact considerations add 
more to a patent’s net value, and the pendency effects here—while existent—
are not substantial. 
These four considerations—market, signal, impact, and reputational 
value—are all derived from the quality of a patent. But not all four are 
harmed by the pendency before the USPTO and, in the case of signaling, 
may actually benefit from it. 
 
III. MODULATING QUALITY BEYOND PENDENCY 
An obvious, if imperfect, initiate to decrease the lengthy wait at the 
USPTO is to hire and train more examiners so that each examiner has a 
decreased workload, less top-down pressures, and the opportunity to give 
each application a more thorough investigation.84 But even increasing the 
staff of examiners could prove to be a stopgap solution if the number of 
applications filed annually continues to rise.85 
Thus, if the pendency issue is considered an insurmountable one—if the 
backlog of patents and quality variance of examiners suggests that the 
pendency will never be significantly decreased to make up for the signal-
disclosure paradox set forth above—perhaps patent quality can be modulated 
in other ways. Facilitation of an expedited patent prosecution process can be 
modulated in three ways: reduced cost, the (already implemented) Patent 
Prosecution Highway, and the publication of a search report. Each may slash 
at the pendency before the USPTO, but a published search report, similar to 
what is found in the EPO, would allow examiners to focus their time more 
specifically on the search component before delving into the validity (i.e. 
examination) component of the patent.86 This would allow examiners more 
time to understand complicated art units and determine relevant prior art in 
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a detached setting from the validity at hand, enabling prosecution with higher 
fidelity. 
A. Cost  
One means to diminish pendency is cost. The financial barrier to entry 
before the EPO is higher than that before the USPTO, and EPO pendency is 
shorter. Specifically, the EPO requires a search fee of €1,300 (about $1,500) 
with examination and designation fees added to sum to just under €3,000.87 
Additionally, the EPO requires renewal fees post-issuance of €470 beginning 
in the third year of the term.88 At the USPTO, the application fee is a 
comparable $1,600, but the combined application and issue fee is just $2,560 
with renewal fees due at 3.5 years post-issuance.89 That’s not to belittle the 
total expense; indeed, a conservative estimate is that applicants spent about 
$7.5 billion pursuing patents in 2012—dwarfing the approximately $1.4 
billion the USPTO spent examining applications the same year.90 
“Pricing out” frivolous applications by increasing the filing and 
examining cost could have the unwanted effect of dissuading junior and 
smaller inventors from filing due to economic constraints.91 Fortunately, the 
USPTO already incentivizes smaller inventors through decreased pricing 
structures, including 50% and 75% fee reductions, depending on the size and 
income of the filing inventor or entity.92 A sliding-scale pricing model, in 
which application fees are adjusted based upon technology group, novelty 
(by number of citations) and inventor-size, may facilitate a protocol by which 
the USPTO can price-out frivolous applications without deterring serious 
applicants. 
There are additional, extensive considerations in the cost-prosecution 
matrix that may indeed filter filed claims such that applicants are already 
motivated to file only claims at a certain threshold validity. Such an 
explanation, as put forth by Stephen Yelderman at Harvard Law School, may 
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counter the idea that cost could have a determinative effect on pendency.93 
That is, if claims are already filtered ex ante based on their relative validity 
in terms of their cost, then upping the costs to file or prosecute at the USPTO 
would seemingly “knock out” only preselected, valid claims.94 Yelderman 
writes that: 
Although applicants have the option of filing a theoretically unlimited number 
of claims, not every conceivable claim is necessarily worth filing. . . . Given 
these incremental expenses, applicants will rationally seek to avoid filing claims 
that have an expected value that is less than the expected marginal cost to obtain 
them.95 
There is, then, a floor beneath which claim value is insufficient to 
justify filing.96 While raising this floor could, in Yelderman’s considerations, 
decrease the number of filings—and resultantly the pendency period—it 
would likely decrease the quantity of good patents and run counter to USPTO 
prerogative.97 
B. Patent Prosecution Highway 
A second measure taken by the USPTO to decrease pendency is the 
institution of the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH), a joint program with 
other major patent offices worldwide that was founded on the theory that a 
valid patent in one jurisdiction should have an accelerated track to issuance 
in another.98 The PPH provides a means to facilitate expedited prosecution 
in a partnering country given allowance in another.99 Resultantly, PPH 
applications before the USPTO were issued in 84% of cases, compared to 
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53% for non-PPH applications.100 While accelerated prosecution does not 
include a legal presumption of validity, it does allow an officer of the later 
examining office to reuse search and examination materials to more quickly 
and efficiently pursue the application.101 
Here, the pendency versus quality dichotomy could not be more 
apparent; because PPH applications have already been examined by a foreign 
patent office, they may arrive before the USPTO with claims significantly 
narrower than an unexamined application sent directly. While this narrower 
scope increases the probability of patentability, it also means that unclaimed 
material may be “left on the table,” inaccessible to a PPH applicant. 
Additionally, and in spite of a PPH application being placed on a USPTO 
examiner’s “special” docket, examination times can vary markedly based on 
the number of other matters on the docket. Thus, though prosecution times 
under the PPH are generally faster, they are likely due to prosecution 
beginning earlier, not the simplified process provided by an already-
examined application.102 
While the PPH allows for marginal increases in speed before the 
USPTO, the same is not true for PPH applications submitted to the EPO.103 
That is, “anecdotal evidence suggests that PPH applications at the EPO 
actually have lower rates of allowance and longer pendencies than the 
average.”104 Of course, the nature of slower and less-patentable subject 
matter moving from the USPTO to the EPO is not directly due to examiner-
examiner comparisons; rather, the EPO mandates its own substantive search 
and examination procedures be applied to incoming PPH applications 
“irrespective of the application’s prosecution and granting in another 
country.”105 
And while the EPO currently provides no data on PPH applications 
other than the number of applications filed, there is no available data 
available suggesting that PPH applications at the EPO show any substantive 
improvement in speed or outcome, hampering the feasibility of major 
improvements to the USPTO from PPH expansion.106 
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C. Search Report 
A potential implementation to deter low-quality patents (and thus 
reduce the backlog of patents awaiting prosecution) would be 
implementation of a search report similar to what is requisite in the European 
Patent Office. Publication of a search report would likely increase the 
withdrawal rate from the USPTO and place it more on par with the EPO 
where withdrawals rather than rejections make up the majority of all non-
granted European patent applications.107 Implementation of such a 
commitment step for inventors would create a sufficient barrier to entry to 
decrease frivolous (or simply nonviable) applications from being filed. 
A search report would allow examiners to focus their time more 
specifically on the search component before delving into the validity 
component, again mirroring what happens at the EPO.108 Studies have found 
that two-thirds of USPTO examiners believe they have somewhat less or 
much less time than needed to complete a thorough prior art search—
something they were allowed under former Director David Kappos.109 
It is unclear that requisite search reports and bifurcating the search and 
examination proceedings would significantly decrease the PTO workload in 
the absence of other structural changes. Considering the newly-filed 
application-to-examiner ratio at the EPO is roughly half that of the USPTO 
(37.85 (160,000 applications:4227 examiners) compared to the USPTO’s 
73.62 (600,000:8150)), the USPTO would need more drastic measures than 
simple search report publication to cut pendency by a significant margin.110 
A combination of the three options, if implemented today—a reduced 
cost, an option to ride the Patent Prosecution Highway, and the publication 
of a search report—may streamline the USPTO sufficiently to make 
significant progress on decreasing pendency. But in a climate where big 
changes are scarce—and budgetary concerns dictate policy—even the 
implementation of a published prior art search report before an examiner 
conducts the application’s validity examination would constitute significant 
inroads towards a more efficient patent system in the United States. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Part I of this paper looked at the patent office function and the factors 
that feed into pendency—from application backlog, improver examiner 
incentives, and an influx of applications. Part II considered the value-quality-
 
 107 Chien & Kesan, supra note 5. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
208 
worth dynamics of a patent and how pendency—while depriving applicants 
of raw financial gain—may not inhibit a patent from being valuable. Part III 
sought potential improvements to the patent system in the United States. 
If patents are considered to have “quality” only if they are (a) valid and 
(b) litigation-proof, then the USPTO is not doing its job. But instead, if the 
quality-value-worth matrix is widened via the introduction of patent 
signaling, reputation, or minor, readily implementable tweaks to the Patent 
Office, patents have value beyond any monetary considerations and the 
pendency consideration is not a significant detriment to filing. 
